No. 22-849

Rickie Foy v. United States

Lower Court: Seventh Circuit
Docketed: 2023-03-08
Status: Denied
Type: Paid
Response RequestedResponse WaivedRelisted (2)
Tags: bank-theft criminal-intent criminal-law felony-bank-theft mens-rea sentencing statutory-interpretation substantive-element valuation-requirement
Key Terms:
Privacy JusticiabilityDoctri
Latest Conference: 2023-06-22 (distributed 2 times)
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether a conviction for conspiring to commit felony bank theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2113(b), requires the government to prove that the defendant intended to steal more than $1,000 because the valuation element is a substantive element of the offense

Question Presented (from Petition)

QUESTION PRESENTED Rickie Foy was convicted of conspiring to commit felony bank theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2113(b), for unsuccessfully attempting to break into an ATM. Section 2113(b) makes it a felony offense to steal a bank’s money “exceeding $1,000” (first paragraph) and a misdemeanor offense to steal money “not exceeding $1,000” (second paragraph). This Court has held that § 2113(b) describes two “distinct offenses” and that the valuation requirement is an “element of each paragraph’s offense, rather than a sentencing factor.” Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 272-273 (2000). The district court sustained Mr. Foy’s felony conviction after a three-hour trial by videoconference, even though the government submitted no evidence and made no argument that Mr. Foy had intended to steal more than $1,000. The court of appeals affirmed and held that no mens rea requirement applies to the valuation element of the felony offense under § 2113(b). The question presented is: Whether a conviction for conspiring to commit felony bank theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2113(b), requires the government to prove that the defendant intended to steal more than $1,000 because the valuation element is a substantive element of the offense. ii STATEMENT OF

Docket Entries

2023-06-26
Petition DENIED.
2023-06-06
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 6/22/2023.
2023-06-05
Waiver of the 14-day waiting period for the distribution of the petition pursuant to Rule 15.5 filed by petitioner.
2023-06-05
2023-05-26
Brief of respondent United States in opposition filed.
2023-04-21
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including May 26, 2023.
2023-04-19
Motion to extend the time to file a response from April 26, 2023 to May 26, 2023, submitted to The Clerk.
2023-03-27
Response Requested. (Due April 26, 2023)
2023-03-22
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 4/14/2023.
2023-03-15
Waiver of right of respondent United States to respond filed.
2023-03-02
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due April 7, 2023)
2022-12-15
Application (22A527) granted by Justice Barrett extending the time to file until March 2, 2023.
2022-12-05
Application (22A527) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from January 1, 2023 to March 2, 2023, submitted to Justice Barrett.

Attorneys

Rickie Foy
John S. SkiltonPerkins Coie LLP, Petitioner
John S. SkiltonPerkins Coie LLP, Petitioner
United States of America
Elizabeth B. PrelogarSolicitor General, Respondent
Elizabeth B. PrelogarSolicitor General, Respondent