Whether tire-chalking falls outside the administrative-search exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement

QUESTION PRESENTED The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Without a warrant or individualized suspicion, a search is unconstitutional unless it falls within one of “a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 419 (2015) (citation omitted). The Court has repeatedly cautioned against expanding those “jealously and carefully drawn” exceptions, Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 498, 499 (1958), beyond what the “Court has recognized,” Caniglia v. Strom, 141 8. Ct. 1596, 1599 (2021). One of those exceptions is the “administrative search” exception. Administrative searches have as their “primary purpose” something other than general crime control, and unless the search affords an opportunity for precompliance review, it must be closely tied to a serious, clear, and specific public safety or health risk. Patel, 576 U.S. at 420; see id. at 424. Those vital interests are things like stopping crossborder smuggling and preventing drunk-driving. The City of San Diego uses tire-chalking—where parking officers draw a chalk mark on the tire of every car in a particular location, for purposes of tracking the car’s movement—to serve generalized interests, like compliance with parking restrictions and minimizing traffic congestion, without affording an opportunity for precompliance review. The question presented is whether tire-chalking falls outside the exception to the warrant requirement and thus violates the Fourth Amendment.