Jenny Bruns, et vir v. USAA, et al.
AdministrativeLaw SocialSecurity DueProcess Privacy JusticiabilityDoctri
Question not identified
QUESTIONS PRESENTED : 1. The conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction ("CTPJ") is nebulous and has no consensus in State : and Federal courts. Does the theory satisfy the Four; ; teenth Amendment's Due Process concerns for nonresident federal antitrust co-conspirators under the Supremacy Clause, without resort to a State's longarm statutes for a private cause of action under 15 U.S.C. §15, when 15 U.S.C. §22 attaches one co, conspirator for venue and personal jurisdiction, in a District where the victim also resides and experienc; a es the injury? : 2: In the alternative, whether the gap-filling All : : Writs Act reaches co-conspirators for personal jurisdiction with a private cause of action, by using the analogous 15 U.S.C. §5, which allows courts on be: half of United States attorneys under §4 to invoke . ; : nationwide jurisdiction over nonresidents to restrain antitrust conspiracies for the ends of justice. . 3. Also in the alternative, whether Georgia v. Penn. : i syluania Railroad Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945), should ~ be overruled to include private attorneys general in . 15 U.S.C. §§4's and 5's scope because the semicolon ; mn §4 insulates the clause that governs district ; : courts' jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of séctions 1 to 7 of the Sherman Act.. : ; ; 4, By burking the gravamen of our complaint's Judi. cial Code Canon 8D claim, did the courts below deny our due process and equal protection rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, thus repudiating Rooker-Feldman and res judicata principles, while permitting an objectively self-imposed disqual: ified State court judge to play "velvet blackjack" with : impunity? @ 5. Under incorporation of the Ninth Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment, can direct crime victims assert the fundamental, deeply rooted federal constitutional right for repose to compel a State to enforce the minimum time that a convicted felon must serve under the published rules governing a lawfully issued incarceration sentence? 6. In the alternative, whether the Court should overrule the Slaughter-House Cases so victims of crime can vindicate the powerful interest in punishing the guilty, shared by the State and Nation alike. 7. Did USAA violate the Sherman Antitrust Act by combining with State court judges (agency capture) to coercively and unreasonably restrain trade, by using categorically forbidden cheating tactics that harm both competition and consumers, frustrating clear, compulsory public policy statutes, whose very purposes are to be extremely protective of vulnerable victims? 8. Whether USAA's relationship with the District Court judge reasonably questions his impartiality, disqualified him under 28 U.S.C. §455(a), and voids his orders. (ii) ii ,