No. 22-980

Neil Paul Noble v. Texas

Lower Court: Texas
Docketed: 2023-04-10
Status: Denied
Type: Paid
Response Waived
Tags: constitutional-rights criminal-procedure due-process fourteenth-amendment fundamental-right harmless-error indictment-notice notice sixth-amendment state-courts
Key Terms:
AdministrativeLaw DueProcess FirstAmendment Patent Privacy
Latest Conference: 2023-05-18
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Is the Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation a fundamental federal constitutional right that should be made applicable to proceedings in state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment?

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED A. Indictment A(1). Notice Is a Fundamental Federal Constitutional Right Is the Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation a fundamental federal constitutional right that should be made applicable to proceedings in state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment? Should lack of sufficient notice of the nature and cause of the accusation under the Sixth Amendment be made constitutional error requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the lack of notice was harmless? Should lack of sufficient notice of the nature and cause of the accusation under the Sixth Amendment be made structural error requiring reversal without a harmless error analysis? A(2). More Precise Notice Are obscenity, harassment, and/or stalking cases classes of cases where more specific pleading should be required than merely repeating the language of the statute? Should the precise comments alleged to be obscene, harassing, or threatening be set-out on the face of the indictment? ii QUESTIONS PRESENTED Continued A(3). Variances Between Indictment and Trial Is the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury indictment in felony cases a fundamental federal constitutional right that should be made applicable to proceedings in state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment? Should a material variance between the allegations in the indictment and the proof at trial be made constitu, tional error for lack of notice requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the variance was harmless? A(4). Indictment Insufficient in This Case Did the indictment provide sufficient notice of the nature and cause of the accusation in order to prepare a defense? Should the State have been required to provide more precise notice in response to the Motion to Quash Noble filed? Should the State have been required to provide notice they were relying on the solicitation provision of the obscenity provision of the harassment statute? (42.07(a)(1), 42.07(b)(3)) Should the State have been required to provide more precise notice of the comments alleged to be obscene, harassing or threatening? Was there a fatal variance between the allegations in the indictment and the evidence at trial? Is evidence pertaining to events not properly plead in the indictment inadmissible at trial? Should the admission of iii QUESTIONS PRESENTED Continued such variance evidence be reviewed on appeal under TRAP 44.2(b) as a variance affecting the substantial rights of the defendant? ; B. Constitutionality of Texas Harassment and Stalking Statutes B(1). Stalking, 42.072 Is the Texas Stalking Statute, Penal Code § 42.072, unconstitutional, in whole or in part? Is § 42.072 unconstitutionally overbroad or vague, either on its face or as applied to Noble? Do any provisions of the Texas Harassment Statute, Penal Code § 42.07, render the § 42.072 unconstitutional? Did the 2013 Amendment to § 42.072 which added an offense under § 42.07 as an element of § 42.072(a)(1) render § 42.072 unconstitutional by allowing essentially the same behavior to be prosecuted as either a Class B Misdemeanor (up to 6 months) or a Third Degree Felony (2 to 10 years), either on its face or as applied to Noble? Is the “knows or reasonably should know” provision of Penal Code § 42.072(a)(1) unconstitutionally overbroad or vague, either on its face or as applied to Noble? iv QUESTIONS PRESENTED Continued B(2). Harassment, 42.07 B(2)(a). Solicitation Provision of 42.07(a)(1) Is the solicitation provision of the obscenity provision of the Texas Harassment statute, Penal Code § 42.07(b)(3) and § 42.07(a)(1), unconstitutional? Does it fail strict scrutiny review? Is it overbroad or vague, either on its face or as applied to Noble? Should the Bruen standard of review be applied to review of the constitutionality of the obscenity provision, § 42.07(a)(1), where the restrictions on obscene com; ments in place around the time the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights were adopted in 1791 are analyzed :

Docket Entries

2023-07-24
Rehearing DENIED.
2023-06-29
DISTRIBUTED.
2023-05-31
2023-05-22
Petition DENIED.
2023-05-05
2023-05-02
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 5/18/2023.
2023-04-27
Waiver of right of respondent Texas to respond filed.
2023-04-05
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due May 10, 2023)

Attorneys

Neil P. Noble
Neil Paul Noble — Petitioner
Neil Paul Noble — Petitioner
State of Texas
Michele O'Brien YeattsDallas County District Attorney, Respondent
Michele O'Brien YeattsDallas County District Attorney, Respondent