Whether a harm to an intangible property interest is a sufficient injury to a business or property interest under RICO

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act is a United States federal law that provides for extended criminal penalties and a civil cause of action for acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal organization. RICO was enacted by section 901 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 and is codified at 18 U.S.C. Ch. 96 as 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. RICO creates a private right of action for “[alny person injured in [her] business or property by reason of a violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1962].” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). To allege civil RICO standing under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(0), a plaintiff must show: (1) that [her] alleged harm qualifies as [an] injury to [her] business or property; and (2) that [her] harm was ‘by reason of’ the RICO violation.” Painters & Allied Trade Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharms. Co. Ltd., 943 F.3d 1243, 1248 (9 Cir. 2019). Here, Petitioner alleged that the Respondents issued verifiable payments to a member of a merit selection panel in the Nevada District Court to elevate their lead counsel to the position of a judge in the same matter, while a dispositive motion was pending. These efforts directly coincided with both the dismissal of the matter in the Nevada District Court and a positive decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission allowing Wynn Resorts to retain gaming licenses on a $2.6 billion casino project in Massachusetts. The gaming licenses were threatened with revocation because of an investigation triggered by Petitioner. The first question is whether a harm to an intangible property interest is a sufficient injury to a business or property interest under RICO. The Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) filed a civil complaint against Steve Wynn for violation of the Foreign u Agents Registration Act (“FARA”) for an alleged attempt to influence the Trump Administration in connection with an effort to drop civil forfeiture proceedings and related matters concerning the embezzlement of billions of dollars from 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB). The matter was entitled, United States of America v. Steve Wynn, Case No. 1:22-cev-01372, and the DOJ’s allegations were central to Petitioner’s RICO claim. The DOJ’s complaint noted, “[almong the chief purposes of FARA is to inform the American public of activities of agents in the United States working for foreign principals to influence U.S. government officials or the American public.” The second question is whether a Circuit court can deny a request for judicial notice, when a party requests it; when the document is not available (because it does not exist) during the proceedings in the District Court; and when the plain language of Fed.R.Evid. 201@(2) states, “[t]he court must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.”