Whether the Ninth Circuit had power to waive Eaton's constitutional rights

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. In determining Whether the Ninth Circuit had power to Waive Eaton’s Constitutional rights in their Memorandum regarding connection of personnel policy to the termination and Pv2, which were vague and unclear. “Waiving of rights” or “arguments abandoned” with “waiver” being “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right” According to Johnson . v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), which Eaton did not knowingly abandon any of his Rights. “[W]aiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least be clear’; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.W. 389, 393 (1937) (stating courts should indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver” in civil cases where fundamental rights were at issue). “Courts do not resume acquiescence in loss of fundamental rights.” : Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937). Could the 9th Circuit’s waiving of rights and focus on PEv1, show a piecemealing of Eaton’s case while not looking at the ‘totality of the case’, thus differing their opinion with 11th Circuit : court that states a negative performance evaluation warrants the claimants case looked at as a whole. 2. Whether the Ninth Circuit violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by not answering all of Eaton’s questions on appeal. Two of ; the questions being, 1) Would the lack of being heard via oral hearing disallow the ability to show existential and substantial evidence which could prove legitimate business reasons were illegitimate. Would the lower courts need to maintain allowance of following Montana ; Codes annotated with allowance of the hearing if they were using other MCA laws for reference in the case? 2) Would altering and withholding of evidence causing ii manipulation of facts-taxes withheld, black hole for emails were not provided. 3) Could this cause the allowance of false pretext reasons for a Legitimate Business Reason could be detrimental to all 7 of Eaton’s Counts, thus diminishing our rights as citizens through a manipulation of words within the documents presented by the lower Courts. 3. In determining whether Ninth Circuit should have evaluated “abuse of Discretion” Rabkin v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 350 F.8d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2003), the Recusal of Judge Watters per F.J. Hanshaw Enters. v. Emerald River Dev. Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001), 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which states: “Any justice, judge or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his : impartiality might be reasonably questioned”, and the Supreme Court delineated the standards where recusal and disqualification would be appropriate in Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994). The 9th Circuit did not address this question directly. Is there pro se litigant bias when Justices make statements within an order (e.g. Eaton v. Montana Silversmith (2022) ; Doc. 132) which is incorrect and misrepresents the brief provided by the litigant (Id. Doc. 129).