Whether a person is 'in custody' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 if that person remains subject for the rest of his life to a state-law sex-offender registration scheme

QUESTION PRESENTED Federal courts “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). This case concerns the standard for an individual to be “in custody” within the meaning of that provision. This Court has explained that, although an individual’s custody may begin when he is placed “behind prison walls and iron bars” (Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963)), it extends beyond those technical confines to any circumstance where the state actively supervises a person’s movements such that “[h]e cannot come and go as he pleases.” Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (limits attending presentence recognizance establishes “custody”). “What matters” is that the restrictions imposed on the petitioner “significantly restrain petitioner’s liberty to do those things which in this country free men are entitled to do.” Jones, 371 U.S. at 243 (parole conditions establish “custody”). The question presented in this case, over which the lower courts are openly divided, is whether a person is “in custody” within the meaning of Section 2254 if that person remains subject for the rest of his life to a state-law sex-offender registration scheme that, among other things, compels his frequent physical appearances for inperson reporting at particular times and places and limits the circumstances under which he may travel, all under threat of criminal sanction.