Whether a registration scheme that requires a person to provide detailed information about every aspect of his life, where failing to provide the information and keep it up to date and accurate is a crime, impinges on a liberty interest sufficient to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause

QUESTION PRESENTED More than 900,000 people in the United States are required to register as sex offenders pursuant to state law. Registration schemes often compel individuals to disclose wide-ranging personal information to the government, make in-person visits to authorities, and notify officials of their movements. The statutes also often publicize an individual’s status as a registered sex offender, resulting in severe social stigmatization. Failure to comply with the stringent registration requirements is often a felony. Federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort sharply divide over whether there is a liberty interest in not being required to register, such that individuals have a right to some kind of process to contest an erroneous registration determination. This Court previously granted certiorari to answer this question in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003), before ultimately ruling on alternative grounds. In a companion case issued the same day, Justice Stevens expressed that the Court had “fail[ed] to decide whether the statutes deprive the registrants of a constitutionally protected interest in liberty.” Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 111 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Given that “(t]he statutes impose significant affirmative obligations and a severe stigma on every person to whom they apply,” id, they “unquestionably affect a constitutionally protected interest in liberty,” id. at 112. The question presented is: Whether a registration scheme that requires a person to provide detailed information about every aspect of his life, where failing to provide the information and keep it up to date and accurate is a crime, impinges on a liberty interest sufficient to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause. (i)