Whether existing Eleventh Circuit precedent of Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003), holding that a Georgia sheriff is an 'arm of the state' when establishing use of force policies at a jail and training and disciplining employees as to use of force, and thus, entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity, can bar the Section 1983 official capacity claims of a prisoner seeking to vindicate the violation of his Eighth Amendment rights where such claims satisfy the standards established by this Court in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), and where such an outcome frustrates the purposes of the Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and creates both a disincentive to protecting the Constitutional rights of prisoners in county jails in Georgia, as well as a bar to prisoners seeking adequate redress when such Constitutional violations occur?

QUESTION PRESENTED This is a Section 1983 case, based on Eighth Amendment violations stemming from the DeKalb County, Georgia Sheriff's Office’s custom and policy of permitting, encouraging, and directing a sergeant at the County Jail to excessively tase inmates, including Petitioner, without penological justification. Petitioner prevailed on his individual capacity claims at trial and was awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The evidence presented at trial was also sufficient for the jury to find that the violation of Petitioner’s constitutional rights occurred as the result of a custom or policy at DeKalb County Sheriffs Office. However, Petitioner was not able to present his official capacity claims to the jury because his claims were dismissed as barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2008). The question presented is: Whether existing Eleventh Circuit precedent of Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003), holding that a Georgia sheriff is an “arm of the state” when establishing use of force policies at a jail and training and disciplining employees as to use of force, and thus, entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity, can bar the Section 1983 official capacity claims of a prisoner seeking to vindicate the violation of his Eighth Amendment rights where such claims satisfy the standards established by this Court in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), and where such an outcome frustrates the purposes of the Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and creates both a disincentive to protecting the Constitutional ii rights of prisoners in county jails in Georgia, as well as a bar to prisoners seeking adequate redress when such Constitutional violations occur?