Is the New York anti-SLAPP statute unconstitutional?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In recent years, many States have enacted socalled anti-SLAPP statutes (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation). These statutes have effectively eliminated the distinction between private figures and public figures, long established by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), because their effect is to require every defamation plaintiff, whether a private or public figure, to prove (not merely plead) malice at the pleading stage, before any discovery. If they cannot do so, they are not only out of court, but often must pay legal fees to the media defendants who have libeled them. The highest Courts of three States have declared their anti-SLAPP statutes to be unconstitutional, because they effectively deprive plaintiffs of the constitutional right to have a jury be the sole finder of the facts. 1. Is the New York anti-SLAPP statute unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment’s distinction between private figures and public figures, as long established by this Court? 2. Is the New York statute unconstitutional as an infringement upon the right of a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment? 3. The right to file a court complaint is petitioning activity protected by the First Amendment. By imposing heightened pleading standards, and the mandatory award of legal fees against a plaintiff, does the statute violate the First Amendment by unduly burdening that right?