Does a rule announced in a four-Justice plurality opinion constitute a holding of this Court, and therefore 'clearly established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1), when no other Justice adopted—either explicitly or implicitly—the plurality's rule or any reasoning supporting that rule?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant relief on a claim that was adjudicated by a state court only if that adjudication was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” The phrase “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” refers to the holdings of this Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). And to evaluate whether a decision is “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,” a holding of this Court, a federal court must apply substantial deference to the state court’s decision and may grant relief only if that decision “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). The questions presented are: 1. Does a rule announced in a four-Justice plurality opinion constitute a holding of this Court, and therefore “clearly established Federal law” under § 2254(d)(1), when no other Justice adopted—either explicitly or implicitly—the plurality’s rule or any reasoning supporting that rule? 2. Did the Sixth Circuit violate § 2254(d)(1)’s strict limitations when it independently analyzed the prejudice prong of an claim without addressing the state court’s prejudice analysis or explaining why the state court’s opposite conclusion was “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement”?