Whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits relying on stereotypes about religious views to strike jurors

QUESTIONS PRESENTED During voir dire in an suit involving a lesbian plaintiff, plaintiffs attorney asked several questions about whether jurors held “conservative Christian” beliefs. When some said yes, counsel asked the court to strike them for cause, arguing, “I don’t think that you can ever rehabilitate yourself, no matter what you turn around and say after that.” The court disagreed, explicitly finding that the jurors “were very clear in that they could be absolutely fair and impartial” and that they believed “everyone needs to be treated equally.” But the court struck them anyway for their religious beliefs “to err on the side of caution.” On appeal, the court agreed the jurors were struck because of their religious “views,” but held that the strike was not unlawful because it was not based on religious “status.” 1. This Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to forbid relying on stereotypes about race and sex to strike jurors. Does the Fourteenth Amendment also prohibit relying on stereotypes about religious views to strike jurors, as 5 courts have held, or not, as 5 other courts (including below) have held? 2. Is a Batson-type violation structural, as at least 18 courts have held, or is it subject to harmless-error review, as the court below held? 3. In the context of jury selection, does the Fourteenth Amendment protect both religious status and religious belief, as 4 courts have held; religious status only, as 3 courts have held (including the court below); or neither, as 2 courts have held?