Whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' decision that Mr. Broadnax failed to establish a prima facie equal protection claim conflicts with this Court's Batson jurisprudence?

QUESTION PRESENTED In this capital case involving a Black defendant and two White victims, the prosecution disclosed to Petitioner’s counsel, only after state habeas proceedings had concluded, (1) a spreadsheet used by prosecutors during jury selection that tracked each qualified prospective juror by race and singled out the Black prospective jurors by marking them in bold text, and (2) a prosecutor’s notes establishing that race was the basis for striking a qualified Black juror. The prosecution struck all seven Black prospective jurors during jury selection. “Because of the risk that the factor of race may enter the criminal justice process, [this Court has] engaged in ‘unceasing efforts’ to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal justice system,” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 (1987) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986)), and in particular from jury selection, see Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 404-10 (1991); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 341-47 (2003) (“Miller-E1 I’); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 237-40 (2005) (“Miller-El IT’); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476-86 (2008); Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 499-514 (2016); Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2238-51 (2019). The newly disclosed evidence of Batson violations in Mr. Broadnax’s case demonstrates that the Court’s work is not done. Having been only recently admonished in Miller-El I and Miller-El IT for a well-documented culture of racial discrimination in jury selection, Dallas prosecutors put in writing—in a document created by the State during the 2009 jury selection process that was not produced by the State to Mr. Broadnax until 2021—that race was the “only concern” with a Black prospective juror: (I) Am. First Subsequent Habeas Appl., No. WR-81,573-02, Ex. B (excerpted; highlighting added). Dallas prosecutors then withheld this evidence of their race-based motives for striking Black jurors until it was too late for Mr. Broadnax to present that evidence during the initial state and federal review of his conviction. Review is necessary here because the newly disclosed evidence establishes that a DA’s office with a long and notorious history of racially discriminatory jury selection practices continued to flout this Court’s direction. Left undisturbed, the State’s explicit discrimination will erode the Court’s authority and public confidence in our criminal justice system. The question presented here is: Whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision that Mr. Broadnax failed to establish a prima facie equal protection claim conflicts with this Court’s Batson jurisprudence? (II)