Whether the judge-made 'clearly established law' qualified immunity standard should be abolished or limited

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Court’s “qualified immunity jurisprudence stands on shaky ground.” Hoggard v. Rhodes, 141 S. Ct. 2421 (2021) (Thomas, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari). Its “clearly established law” standard lacks any textual or historical link to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and bears no resemblance to the origins of the qualified immunity doctrine, see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). The modern standard has also proven unworkable in practice, with the Court routinely using certiorari and per curiam opinions to correct lower court confusion and errors. The policy rationales relied upon to justify qualified immunity have likewise proven misplaced. The Court has never explained why the law requires a one-size-fits-all standard that provides the same immunity to deskbound governmental officials— who have ample time to ponder decisions—as it grants to police officers in the field, who must make split-second decisions in life-or-death situations. These shortcomings have led several justices to question or even recommend reconsidering the doctrine. See Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1862 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 187172 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1155 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. ii 158, 171-72 (1992) (Kennedy, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring). . The Supreme Court of Rhode Island’s decision in Felkner v. Rhode Island College, 291 A.3d 1001 (2023) (Felkner IV) exemplifies the manifold defects in current qualified immunity jurisprudence, leaving Petitioner William Felkner without a remedy for the abridgement of his core First Amendment right to freedom of speech by college administrators and faculty. The Court should overrule the “clearly ‘established law” standard on which the Supreme Court of Rhode Island relied in granting the Respondents summary judgment on Felkner’s § 1983 claims. Or, at a minimum, it should limit the qualified immunity doctrine to emergent situations. Alternatively, the Court should clarify the level of specificity required for a right to be “clearly established” and hold that Felkner’s free speech rights had been so established already. Petitioner thus presents two questions for ; certiorari: 1. Whether the judge-made “clearly established law” qualified immunity standard, which lacks textual, historical, and logical support, and which does not advance its purported policy objectives, should be : : abolished or limited? 2. Whether respondents are entitled to qualified immunity on Felkner’s First Amendment claims : when they had ample time to reflect and seek legal . ill counsel prior to engaging in a sustained course of conduct that abridged Petitioner’s clearly established First Amendment right to freedom of speech? iv ,