Marshall B. Lloyd, et al. v. Ford Motor Company
Environmental Arbitration Jurisdiction
Are state deceptive advertising statutes impliedly preempted when the EPCA expressly permits state laws with requirements identical to those under the Act and Ford is alleged to have violated EPA requirements, such that parallel state enforcement aids in the accomplishment of Congressional objectives?
QUESTION PRESENTED Section 32919(b) of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) expressly permits a State “to adopt or enforce a law or regulation on disclosure of fuel economy” where “the law or regulation is identical” to requirements under section 32908. Section 382908(b) requires that “[ujnder regulations of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, a manufacturer of automobiles shall attach a label to a prominent place on each automobile” containing “the fuel economy of the automobile.” Under regulations of the EPA, Ford is required to test its automobiles’ fuel economy in compliance with specific and repeatable “coastdown” tests. Petitioners who purchased Ford automobiles allege in their complaint that Ford violated these coastdown test requirements and seek to hold Ford accountable under state deceptive advertising statutes for representations regarding fuel economy determined in violation of EPA regulations. The question presented is: Are state deceptive advertising statutes impliedly preempted when the EPCA expressly permits state laws with requirements identical to those under the Act and Ford is alleged to have violated EPA requirements, such that parallel state enforcement aids in the accomplishment of Congressional objectives?