Whether the Eleventh Circuit's application of the 'shotgun pleading' standard conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court precedent

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether the Eleventh Circuit’s application of the “shotgun pleading” standard to affirm the dismissal of the Petitioner’s complaint for violations of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights asserted under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, conflicts with the plain language and pleading requirements of Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the heightened pleading requirements affirmed in the Supreme Court’s precedent in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and the remains of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), as well as with decisions in its own circuit, when the complaint provided notice of the claims to the defendants, and when the defendants were clearly able to discern the claims against them and even asserted affirmative defenses to those claims. 2. Whether, in affirming the dismissal of the Petitioner’s subsequently amended complaints, filed without leave but following a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision contravenes the provisions of Rule 15(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits a party to amend “once as a matter of course” within twenty-one (21) days after service of such a motion, as well as deviating from the Supreme Court’s interpretive guidance in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), which generally leans in favor of permitting amendments “when justice so requires.”