Seneca Lovett Engel v. Derek Engel, et al.
SocialSecurity Antitrust DueProcess FourthAmendment Privacy Jurisdiction JusticiabilityDoctri
Whether claims for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(8) and § 1983 are sufficiently stated under Fed. Rule Civ. P. 8(2)
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW In Beil Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, this Court construed the pleading requirements under Fed. Rule Civ. P. 8 and held the complaint, alleging a conspiracy under § 1 of the Sherman Act, insufficient due to an “obvious alternative explanation” that did involve conspiracy and that the complaint failed to answer for. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567-68 (2007). In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Court reviewed discrimination claims against two high-ranking government officials and, like Twombly, held the complaint insufficient because an “obvious alternative explanation” existed that did not involve purposeful discrimination. Iqbal, at 682. While the Twombly Court cautioned that it was not announcing a heightened pleading standard, id., at 570 (“we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics”), courts have construed Twombly and Iqbal to require just that, and the decision below is a case in point. The question presented is: Whether claims for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(8) and § 1983 are sufficiently stated under Fed. Rule Civ. P. 8(2), so as to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, where the complaint alleges a detailed sequence of events from which a conspiracy may reasonably be inferred, including reference to public records which enhance the complaint’s factual allegations, where there are no obvious alternative explanations to the conspiracy or the constitutional violations resulting therefrom, and where direct evidence of the agreement to conspire may only be developed from adverse witnesses through discovery. ii STATEMENT OF