Whether the Washington Voting Rights Act is subject to strict scrutiny

QUESTION PRESENTED In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), this Court held that something more than the mere existence of racially polarized voting was required for an at-large voting system to implicate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Plaintiffs must also show that a racial group is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.” Id. at 50. This additional requirement is a constitutional guardrail, ensuring that Section 2 does not become a rule requiring “maximum possible voting strength” for one minority group over another, entangling courts in race-based inquiries and “racebased predictions.” Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (2009) (plurality opinion). Without it, Section 2 could be read to “unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every redistricting, raising serious constitutional questions.” Id. at 21. Washington recently adopted its own voting rights act that expressly eschews the Gingles “compactness” requirement. App. 73-74. Without that requirement, a municipality must change from atlarge elections to districts when there is racially polarized voting. Petitioner challenged the Act as unconstitutional because it makes race the reason why municipalities must change election systems. App. 3. Applying only rational basis review, the Washington Supreme Court held the Washington Voting Rights Act is constitutional. App. 35-39. The question presented is: Whether the Washington Voting Rights Act is subject to strict scrutiny.