Carlos Antonio Raymond v. JPMorgan Chase Bank
SocialSecurity DueProcess FirstAmendment Securities Jurisdiction
Whether the violation of standard of review for summary judgment be allowed to stand uncorrected or violator go unpunished
QUESTION PRESENTED This case is of national importance because they effect the rights to substantive and procedural due process and diminishing trust in the judicial system by “we, the people”. The decisions of the Fifth Circuit and U.S. District Court “reflected a clear deviation and misapprehension of summary judgment standards in light of [Supreme Court] precedents” --like what happened in Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 659, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1868 (2014) (per curiam). By Overruling and Ignoring Petitioner Raymond's detailed facts of the case violated Procedural, First, Fifth, Seventh and Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court “axiom[s]’, “general rule[s]”, and “fundamental principle[s}” governing summary judgment. Id., 134 S.Ct. at 651, 656, 660. The U.S. Supreme Court precedents require that, “The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). That did NOT happen here. The U.S. Supreme Court precedents require that, “the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence." The weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or direct verdict. That did NOT happen here. / “Courts must review the evidentiary materials submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment to ensure that the motion is supported by admissible evidence. If the evidence submitted in support of the summary judgment motion does not meet the movant's burden, then summary judgment must be denied.” That did NOT happen here. The court's function on a motion for summary judgment is “to determine whether material factual issues exist, not to resolve such issues.” Lopez v. Beltre, 59 A.D.3d 683, 685 (2d Dept. 2009). A motion for summary judgment, therefore, “should not be granted where the facts are in dispute, where conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, or where there are issues of credibility’ ” Ruiz v. Griffin, 71 A.D.3d 1112, 1115 (2d Dept. 2010), quoting Scott v. Long Is. ‘ ii Power Auth., 294 A.D.2d 348, 348 (2d Dept. 2002). See also Bykov v. Brody, 150 AD 3d 808, 809 (2d Dept. May 10, 2017) (“Resolving questions of credibility, determining the accuracy of witnesses, and reconciling the testimony of witnesses are for the trier of fact.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). That did not happen here. (APP. 1, 2) ; “Courts remained wary of summary disposition because they “perceiv[ed] it as threatening a denial of such fundamental guarantees as the right to confront witnesses, the right of the jury to make inferences and determinations of credibility, and the right to have one’s cause advocated by counsel before a jury. "The standard formulation was that summary judgment should be denied whenever there was the “slightest doubt as to the factsciting See Armco Steel Corp. v. Realty Inv. Co., 273 F.2d 483, 484 (8th Cir. 1960) (cited in CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2532, at 307 (1995)); That did not happen here. This Court, therefore, must resolve the Reason For The Writ in the light most favorable to Petitioner. | addition, under 42 U.S. Code § 1983, Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 53(b) and First Amendment, give the right to sue those who violate the laws under its purview in Federal District Court. The statute authorizes district courts in such cases to issue “a permanent injunction.” Seven courts of appeals have held that district courts exercising that authority may enter an injunction that requires defendants to return to the victims of their wrongdoing funds obtained through their illegal activity. Other Appellate Court have held the opposite. Thus, the QUESTIONS PRESENTED are as follows: Whether The Violation of Standard of Review for Summary Judgment (Rule 60(d)(3); 18 U.S. Code § 1341;