Should the Dost factors be modified to prevent unconstitutional restrictions on First Amendment freedom of expression?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1. Should the six factor analysis set forth in United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd sub nom United States v. Weigand, 812 F.2d 1239 (1987) be modified in order to prevent an unconstitutional restriction on the First Amendment freedom of expression which the petitioner argues occurred in this case and in numerous other cases nationwide and which reflects a split among the federal and state courts? 2. Because Connecticut’s “employing a minor in an obscene performance” statute is cast in the language of Miller v. California’s obscenity test and the lower court held it relied on Miller and Dost without articulating why an average person would find the images, taken as a whole, appealed to the prurient interest and why they depicted “in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct,” when there is no sexual touching or conduct occurring in the images, should this Court grant certiorari to set a benchmark regarding the “obscene to minors” doctrine to guide courts about what these Miller criteria mean?