Whether the Sixth Circuit applied the proper materiality standard under Brady v. Maryland

QUESTIONS PRESENTED I. Carl Lindsey was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death based on the critical testimony of Kathy Kerr, the lone witness to testify that she saw the victim’s wife give Lindsey a gun and saw Lindsey standing near the victim’s body. The prosecution, however, withheld evidence that it had granted Kerr testimonial immunity. The Sixth Circuit denied Lindsey a certificate of appealability (COA) on his claim that the withholding of Kerr’s immunity deal violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Sixth Circuit’s denial of a COA raises the following questions: a. May a reviewing court find immaterial under Brady withheld evidence that impeaches the prosecution’s key witness by stating that there was “overwhelming evidence” of the petitioner’s guilt, without engaging ina thorough analysis of the impact of the withheld evidence on the witness’ credibility and the jury’s guilt and sentencing verdicts? Compare Pet. for Cert. in Glossip v. Oklahoma, U.S. No. 22-6500 (querying whether withheld evidence impeaching key witness was material under Brady); Pet. for Cert. in Glossip v. Oklahoma, U.S. No. 22-7466 (querying whether reviewing court properly applied Brady to withheld evidence that impeaches key witness); Pet. for Cert. in Johnson v. Alabama, U.S. No. 22-7337 (same). b. In denying a COA, did the Sixth Circuit apply an unduly burdensome standard for granting a certificate, and is Lindsey entitled to a COA on his Brady claim? Il. After securing significant evidence of Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) that trial counsel failed to investigate or present at sentencing, Carl Lindsey filed a motion to amend his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because he filed the motion after timely filing a motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. __ (2022) holds that, at the time, there was “no longer a final judgment to appeal from.” Jd. at ___ (slip op. at 3). Banister leaves open a question that is the subject of a circuit split: When a party seeks leave to amend a petition after timely filing a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), is the party entitled to amend upon satisfying Fed. R. Civ. P. 15’s pre-judgment standards, or must the party also satisfy Rule 59’s standards for amending a judgment? i