Jeremy David Adams v. United States
(I). Is the Sixth Circuit's new rule, in opposition to 7 other Courts of Appeals - that the protections of Speedy Trial Act 18 USC § 3161(h)(l)(H)'s 30 day 'under advisement ' period can be bypassed when no hearing was ever held for an infinitely pending bond motion - thereby denying pretrial release under § 3164(c), correct?
(II). Where a pro forma continuance under 18 USC § 3161(h)(7)(A) for 'pretrial motion preparation' was raised sua sponte at arraignment, can that time be excluded when there are no contemporaneous case-specific facts to support that the preparation would be anything other than routine?
(III). Does the reasonably necessary" delay exclusion of § 3161(h)(7) continuances have a different meaning and application under § 3164 because of the different context in which it arises, because the harm caused by postponing a trial is not comparable to the harm caused by continued oppressive pretrial detention?
(IV). If the government forfeited a Speedy Trial Act exclusion argument (that an infinitely pending bond motion excludes all time), is that argument on appeal: (1) waived because it was an affirmative defense?; (2) waived because the district court did not provide fair notice when it raised the argument sua sponte ?; (3) forfeited but prevail on plain error review?; or (4) not waived or forfeited and as if the government had raised it itself?
(V). Is the government excepted from the party presentation principle? Can a Court of Appeals affirm on any argument supported by the record, even if the government didn't raise the argument in either instance - that withdrawing a pending bond motion deprived the district court from holding a hearing?
Question not identified