Was the Oklahoma court's decision to approve reinstating Ms. Tiger's convictions based on such a novel and unforeseeable change in state procedural law that this Court may review her challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act and McGirt?

QUESTION PRESENTED In 2018, an Oklahoma state court sentenced Ms. Tiger, an enrolled member of the Seminole Nation, to 10 years in prison based on her plea of nolo contendere to two counts of child abuse. The crimes took place on the Chickasaw Nation. After this Court decided McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decided Bosse v. State, 484 P.3d 296 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021), the trial court granted Ms. Tiger’s petition for postconviction relief. It ruled that the Chickasaw Nation reservation had never been disestablished by Act of Congress, such that only a federal court had jurisdiction to convict and sentence her under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. See also United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 651 (1978) (“This concession, based on the assumption that § 1153 ordinarily is pre-emptive of state jurisdiction when it applies, seems to us to be correct.”). And it ruled that Ms. Tiger’s claim was not barred because a challenge to its subject-matter jurisdiction is cognizable in postconviction proceedings. The trial court stayed its ruling to facilitate Ms. Tiger’s transfer to federal custody. The state did not appeal the order granting postconviction relief. Thus the determination that only the federal government had jurisdiction over the charges against Ms. Tiger became law of the case. Five months later, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held, in State ex rel. Matloff v. Wallace, 497 P.3d 686 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021), that McGirt did not apply retroactively to cases like Ms. Tiger’s that were final when McGirt was decided. The state then moved to reinstate her convictions. II Based on Matloff, the trial court reinstated her conviction. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, over the separate dissents of two judges. The court held that reinstating Ms. Tiger’s convictions was required by Matloff. In so ruling, the court overlooked the fact that the trial court’s prior order granting postconviction relief had been final, such that the state’s belated motion, based on Matloff, was the equivalent of an untimely appeal. It pointed to no state-law authority supporting the trial court’s decision to entertain the equivalent of an untimely appeal of its prior order granting postconviction relief. And it overlooked the lawof-the-case doctrine in order to reinstate Ms. Tiger’s convictions. This case presents the following questions: 1. Was the Oklahoma court’s decision to approve reinstating Ms. Tiger’s convictions based on such a novel and unforeseeable change in state procedural law that this Court may review her challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act and McGirt? See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1983) (explaining that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review statecourt rulings that are based on adequate and independent grounds in state law). 2. If so, should the Court grant the petition, vacate the judgment below, and remand this case for further proceedings in light of Cruz v. Arizona, 143 S. Ct. 650 (2023)?