1(a). DOES A SECOND DEGREE MURDER CONVICTION PRECLUDE A SHOWING OF PREJUDICE WHEN COUNSEL'S ERRORS WHICH PRECLUDED THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION OF MICHIGAN'S DEFENSE OF ACCIDENT UNDER C3I2D 7.2 INSTRUCTIONS TO EXCUSE THE DEFENDANT'S DISCHARGE OF THE GUN IF THE KILLING WAS ACCIDENTAL, THEREBY, LEFT THE JURY'S CHARGE ON IMPLIED MALICE FROM THE USE OF A GUN SATISFIED?

1(b). DID TRIAL COUNSEL FAIL TO INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT "ACCIDENT" AS A DEFENSE, TO INSTEAD, PRESENT AN INSUFFICIENT SELF-DEFENSE CLAIM AFTER A LESS THAN THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF THE LAW AND FACTS RELEVANT TO PLAUSIBLE OPTIONS?

2(a). WAS THE SIXTH CIRCUIT'S PRECLUSION OF PREJUDICE BY DRAWING A CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT FROM BASIC FACTS, (WHICH, DESPITE COUNSEL'S MISREPRESENTATIONS, THE JURY COULD HAVE REASONABLY CREDITED AS BEING COMMITTED WITH AN INNOCENT STATE OF MIND), CONTRARY TO OR AN UNREASONABLE APPLICATION OF STRICKLAND?

2(b). WAS COUNSEL'S MULTIPLE ACTS OF MISREPRESENTATION, DURING A TRIAL PREMISED ON CREDIBILITY, SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH STRICKLAND PREJUDICE?

Does a second degree murder conviction preclude a showing of prejudice