Did these instructions, which imposed on the defendant a burden of proving her innocence of second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, violate due process

question presented is: Did these instructions, which imposed on the defendant a burden of proving her innocence of second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, violate due process under In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 214 (1977)? In particular, does this shifting of the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defendant, as to an element historically placed on the state as part of proving murder, go beyond the constitutional limits on re-allocation of burdens left undefined in Patterson? 2. The trial court instructed the jury that second degree murder had two elements, and that voluntary manslaughter had those same two elements plus an additional element (state of passion). It instructed the jury that voluntary manslaughter was a lesser offense of second-degree murder. It also instructed the jury that it could consider a lesser included offense only if it unanimously acquitted on the greater offense. Together, these instructions if followed meant that the jury could never correctly return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter; if it found the first two elements it would return a murder verdict and if it did not find them it could not convict on manslaughter either. The second question presented is: Did these instructions, which if followed exactly ruled out any possibility of a conviction for voluntary manslaughter, violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial and right to present a defense? ii