This petition seeks a review of a wrongful alleged conspiracy conviction.

A. There are three foundational prerequisites which must be established to admit a coconspirator's statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E): (i) that a conspiracy existed; (ii) that defendant was a member of the conspiracy; and (iii) that the declarant's statement was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Martinez de Ortiz, 907 F.2d 629, 631-32 (7th Cir. 1990)

B. The law requires corroboration of a testimony to sustain a conviction, when no direct evidence connects a defendant to the crime and the evidence of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is supplied solely by circumstantial evidence, by the trial testimony of a codefendant, and by the out-of-court statements made by government witness. United States v. Silverman, 861 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1988). Interpreting the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bourjaily, the Ninth Circuit holds that evidence of the defendant's participation in a conspiracy must be established by independent corroborating evidence which is "fairly incriminating" in itself.

C. In Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the trial court may consider the out-of-court co-conspirator declaration which the government seeks to admit in deciding whether there was a conspiracy - a predicate for the admissibility of the statement before the jury. However, the Court also cautioned that such hearsay statements are presumptively unreliable and, therefore, while they may be considered in deciding whether there was a conspiracy involving the declarant and the defendant, there must be some independent corroborating evidence of the defendant's participation in the conspiracy.

D. The Supreme Court has long since held that the due process clause protects against convictions based on testimony that the prosecutor knew or should have known was false. See, e.g., White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764 (1945) (acknowledging that obtaining conviction through knowing use of perjury violates due process).

1. Whether a preliminary finding of a conspiracy could be based solely on the contested hearsay statement.

2. Whether an accused can be convicted of a crime on the testimony of an accomplice, uncorroborated by independent evidence tending to connect the defendant to the commission of the crime.

3. Whether a trial court violates the Sixth Amendment by not instructing the jury on stipulated facts. Biegon did not knowingly and voluntarily stipulate facts comprising elements of the offense. (Stipulation denied Biegon the right to jury trial and suffered a de facto guilt). United States v. Lyons, 898 F2D 210, 215 1st Cir. 1991).

4. Whether Fed.R.Crim Pro. 11 should extend to stipulated facts.

5. Whether in the interest of justice, a layman pro se defendant has a right to the effective assistance of counsel at the post-conviction stage. Judge Schell didn't appoint counsel for Biegon to assist him with his 2255 motion. 18 U.S.C. 3006A(a)(2)(B). Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The Supreme Court held: Left without the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without

Whether a preliminary finding of a conspiracy could be based solely on the contested hearsay statement