Does the court of appeals' opinion conflict with Raddatz and principles of due-process?

QUESTION PRESENTED In United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980), this Court made clear that the designation of authority to a magistrate judge to conduct evidentiary hearings and submit reports and recommendations on motions to suppress, which is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), satisfies due process requirements because the statute requires a district judge to conduct do novo review of the proceedings when a party files objections to the report and recommendation, thus ensuring that the district court is “the ultimate decisionmaker.” 447 U.S. at 680-81. Does the court of appeals’ opinion conflict with Raddatz and principles of due process because it permits a district court to adopt, in its entirety, a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation containing a clear and material factual error and inapplicable language regarding waiver—errors to which the defendant objected—with no explanation except a bare assertion that it had conducted de novo review? RULE 14.1(b) STATEMENT (i) All