What is the appropriate standard for awarding attorneys' fees to a prevailing party under Section 505 of the Copyright Act?

QUESTION PRESENTED 17 U.S.C. § 505 gives district courts discretion to award fees to prevailing parties in copyright cases. In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 579 U.S. 197 (2016), this Court attempted to resolve longstanding confusion among the circuits in applying Section 505. But that confusion persists. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits apply a presumption in favor of awarding fees. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits apply no presumption at all. And in the decision below, the First Circuit expressly held that its pre-Kirtsaeng standard still governs: fees are available only if the plaintiffs position was “objectively quite weak.” Airframe Sys. v. L-3 Comms., 658 F.3d 100, 109 (1st Cir. 2011). That rule not only diverges from every other circuit’s; it is the exact rule this Court rejected in Kirtsaeng as going “too far in cabining how a district court must” exercise its discretion under Section 505. 579 U.S. at 209. The question presented is: What is the appropriate standard for awarding attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party under Section 505 of the Copyright Act?