Whether it violates due process to require a petitioner pursuing a gateway-innocence claim to prove with 'affirmative evidence' that a particular theory of innocence is more likely than not true

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In the twenty-five years since Rodney Reed was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, a “considerable body of evidence” has accumulated that he is innocent. Reed v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 686, 687 (2020) (statement of Sotomayor, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). In 2021, Reed presented overwhelming evidence of innocence at a state habeas hearing that comprehensively dismantled the state’s case against him, confirming that his conviction remains “mired in doubt.” Id. at 690. But the trial court adopted the state’s proposed findings verbatim. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals—unable to cure the trial court’s abdication of its role with no independent way to assess witness credibility—then denied relief, reasoning that Reed had not produced “affirmative evidence” that showed it was more likely than not his theory of the case “is the correct one.” App. 99a, 126a. The questions presented are: 1. Whether it violates due process and contravenes Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), to require a petitioner pursuing a gateway-innocence claim not just to provide new reliable evidence making it more likely than not that a reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt, but to prove with “affirmative evidence” that it is more likely than not that a particular theory of innocence is true. 2. Whether a trial court violates due process when it adjudicates a habeas petition by adopting verbatim the state’s error-riddled findings of fact rather than conducting its own independent analysis of the evidence.