Whether the Second Circuit correctly held that the evidence of venue was legally sufficient under the Venue and Vicinage Clauses of the United States Constitution?

QUESTION PRESENTED Petitioner was convicted of two Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) violations requiring “damage” to protected computers. At trial, the government’s evidence showed that petitioner was in Florida when she deleted her former employer’s data, and that this data physically resided in a database located in servers in Virginia and California. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit found that venue in the Southern District of New York was proper, because, due to petitioner’s actions, users were unable to login remotely to the database to access the data on their computers in New York. It reached this result by construing the CFAA’s definition of “damage,” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8), as broadly as possible, to include a user’s inability to virtually access data, no matter where the data physically resided. Accordingly, the question presented is whether the Second Circuit correctly held that the evidence of venue was legally sufficient under the Venue and Vicinage Clauses of the United States Constitution? ii