Can the foregone conclusion rationale be used to compel an individual to enter a passcode into a personally held cellular phone?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Petitioner Keiron Sneed was charged with forgery related to the mobile deposit of two checks from a Dairy Queen at which his wife was employed. Police seized cellular phones from Mr. Sneed and his wife, and obtained a search warrant for the phones. The phones were passcode protected, and the State filed a motion seeking to compel Mr. Sneed to produce the passcode for the phone seized from him by providing it or entering it into the phone. Mr. Sneed argued that such compelled production would violate his right against self-incrimination enshrined in the Fifth Amendment, and the trial court denied the State’s motion. On appeal by the State, the Fourth District of the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s decision. Mr. Sneed then appealed, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s reversal. It held that the Fifth Amendment did not prevent Mr. Sneed from being compelled to enter the passcode into the seized phone, where the State met the requirements of the “foregone conclusion doctrine” by demonstrating its knowledge of the passcode. The questions presented are: 1. Can the forgone conclusion rationale, described in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), be used as an exception to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and permit the State to compel an individual to truthfully rely on the contents of his mind to enter a passcode into a personally held cellular phone or similar digital device? 2. Ifso, is the State required to show knowledge of the contents of the device inorder to apply the rationale, or is a foregone conclusion analysis satisfied by a showing that the State has knowledge of only the passcode? i