When the government attempts to establish probable cause to search a vehicle during a traffic stop by relying on a certified drug dog's alert, does Harris establish the materiality of the dog's training and performance records under Rule 16 where the defendant contests the reliability of that alert in a motion to suppress evidence?

Question Presented This case involves a circuit split over the materiality of a drug dog’s training and performance records under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, following this Court’s decision in Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2018). In Harris, the Court set forth the appropriate framework for determining whether the “alert” of a drug-detection dog during a traffic stop provides probable cause to search a vehicle in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. It provided that, “if a bona fide organization has certified a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a court can presume (subject to any conflicting evidence offered) that the dog’s alert provides probable cause to search.” 568 U.S. at 246-47. The Court emphasized, however, that the defense “must have an opportunity to challenge such evidence of a dog’s reliability.” Id. at 247. By way of example, the Court suggested that a defendant might challenge reliability by attacking (i) the methods employed in the dog’s training program, (ii) the standards underlying the dog’s certification program, (iii) the dog’s performance in its training or certification programs, or (iv) the circumstances surrounding a particular alert, e.g., if the officer appears to have cued the dog, or the team was working under unfamiliar conditions. Jd. at 247. The question presented is: When the government attempts to establish probable cause to search a vehicle during a traffic stop by relying on a certified drug dog’s alert, does Harris establish the materiality of the dog’s training and performance records under Rule 16 where the defendant contests the reliability of that alert in a motion to suppress evidence? i