Whether a court of appeals may force a petitioner to proceed on appeal without the assistance of counsel after a district court ordered the appointment of counsel sua sponte

QUESTIONS PRESENTED After a United States District Judge orders the appointment of counsel sua sponte “in the interest of justice,” may a United States court of appeals subsequently, while leaving intact the district court’s Order, force the Petitioner to proceed on appeal without the assistance of counsel, or does this action depart so far from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power? When a federal court of appeals upholds a State court conviction that is based on an existing court record so devoid of any evidence to support the conviction, that a federal district court TWICE erroneously concluded that the Petitioner was convicted of an entirely different crime, did the court of appeal’s action depart so far from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power? In United States v. Agurs, 427 US 97 (1976), this Court concluded that “the knowing use of perjured testimony by a prosecutor generally requires that the conviction be set aside.” In Napue v. lilinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) this Court decided that “[t]he same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.” In deciding the case at hand, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the prosecutor's constitutional responsibilities outlined in Agurs and Napue were limited to only witnesses called by the government. Should this ~ Court settle the important federal question of whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment protections outlined in Agurs and Napue extend to all witnesses who offer testimony known by the prosecutor to be false? The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that when the Petitioner allegedly told another person | that he had previously committed a crime, his words were “an implied solicitation.” Recognizing that this Court has previously determined’ that the free speech clause of the First Amendment protects an individual's right to fabricate a story about being something as prestigious as being a military hero, see U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012), which invalidated the Stolen Valor Act, should this Court also decide whether or not the free speech clause of the First Amendment protects an individual’s right to fabricate a story about previously committing a heinous crime? : We live in an age where an overwhelming majority of individuals utilize some type of computerized | device, such as a computer, smartphone or tablet on a daily basis, with many family, friends and coworkers even sharing devices. Yet, as it relates to crimes involving the possession of illicit material : being found on shared computers, there is an absence of unanimity across the United States courts | of appeals as to what satisfies sufficiency of the evidence claims raised under Jackson v. Virginia, | 433 U.S. 307 (1979). Because the Sixth Circuit issued a decision in this case that is in direct conflict | with the holding of several other United States court of appeals on this very important matter, should this Court should settle this important federal question? |