Whether the Ninth Circuit majority unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law

Questions Presented Under this Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, counsel is required to communicate to the accused all favorable plea offers and to counsel the accused on the advantages and disadvantages of the offer. In adjudicating ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on failure to communicate a favorable plea offer, the petitioner must show prejudice by, among other things, that the outcome of the plea proceedings would have been different with competent advice. Lafler c. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The operative state court decision found that trial counsel's failure to communicate a 6-year offer to petitioner was harmless, without considering the effect of presumed competent counsel advice on the likelihood of petitioner accepting the offer rather than face a retrial and life sentence on conviction. That deficiency was likely Accepting the offer would have meant release from custody in a few years. Retrial presented a significant risk of conviction and the consequence of 1 conviction was a life sentence And petitioner could have entered an Alford plea, which would not have required him to renounce his earlier testimony he was innocent. Petitioner’s mother, his closest confidante, would have supported the deal. The state court also required petitioner to prove prejudice under a standard akin to “more likely than not” standard and categorically excluded petitioner’s declaration that he would have accepted the offer from prejudice analysis. On this record, failure to reasonably apply the prejudice standard under Strickland, is the difference between affirming the district court grant of relief and sending petitioner back to prison for life. The district court found the state court’s fact-finding process to be unreasonable under AEDPA and, under de novo standard, granted habeas relief. On state’s appeal, a divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed the grant of habeas; the dissenting judge would affirm the grant. This petition presents the following questions for review: 1. Whether the Ninth Circuit majority unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law by approving as reasonable a state court u prejudice analysis that did not consider the effect of presumed competent counsel advice on likelihood of petitioner accepting the offer? 2. Whether the Ninth Circuit majority unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law by approving as reasonable a state court prejudice analysis, which (1) categorically excluded from consideration petitioner’s declaration that he would have accepted the offer, and (2) required petitioner to prove prejudice to an at least “more likely than not” standard? lil