Does the Seventh Circuit's holding conflict with Schlup, 513 U.S. 298, and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006), because it turned on whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction, instead of a probabilistic assessment of whether Wilson's credible new evidence would have created reasonable doubt in a reasonable juror? And does this error warrant summary reversal?

QUESTION PRESENTED Procedural default bars a state inmate from obtaining federal habeas based on an issue not presented to the state courts. Schlup v. Delo recognized a narrow exception for inmates who can demonstrate “actual innocence,” which opens a “gateway” to excuse procedural default. 513 U.S. 298, 315 (1995). Petitioner Jerry S. Wilson was convicted in state court for a shooting based solely on eyewitness testimony. To support raising a procedurally defaulted issue on federal review, Wilson presented testimony from a new eyewitness demonstrating that the State’s star witness against him was in fact the real shooter. The State conceded that if the new testimony were credible, it could cast reasonable doubt on Wilson’s guilt. The state court found the new testimony credible. In a split decision, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the new, credible testimony—which all agreed would likely have changed the outcome—failed to excuse Wilson’s procedural default. In direct conflict with this Court’s decisions, the Seventh Circuit held Wilson’s claim to a heightened standard from the inapposite context of a challenge. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). The Question Presented is: Does the Seventh Circuit’s holding conflict with Schlup, 513 U.S. 298, and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006), because it turned on whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction, instead of a probabilistic assessment of whether Wilson’s credible new evidence would have created reasonable doubt in a reasonable juror? And does this error warrant summary reversal? See Christeson v. Roper, 574 U.S. 373, 374 (2015) (per curiam). i