Whether the lower court was bound by Darden v. Wainwright under AEDPA

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Lyndon Pace was convicted of four counts of malice murder in an Atlanta, Georgia trial. Thereafter, the prosecutor asked jurors to sentence him to death based upon: (1) ~~ A Playboy magazine cartoon , A a Ma Wey. o bpd, oe Sa 4 Ss Ak CR ee Nag’ aa iy —ooO —— Sa . ~ 7 : SS SS . fornkitns 7m SO “We find ‘the defendant not guilty by virtue of insanity, ethnic rage, 150 ” sexual abuse and you name it.” The defense never raised “insanity, ethnic rage, sexual abuse and you name it,” and the trial court found that the cartoon was not relevant to any issue in the case but allowed the prosecutor to introduce it and seek death based upon what it depicted; (2) A repeated Golden Rule argument graphically stating what the victims must have gone through and asking the jurors to imagine themselves as the victims; (8) Argument that because he had been homeless when he was arrested, a life sentence would not punish but provide “free room and board, color TV” and added “if anal sodomy is your thing, prison isn’t a bad place to be.”; i (4) A comment on the right to silence in that Jesus was crucified between two sinners, one who repented and one “never repented,” and that ‘[Pace] too, has never repented. He hadn’t (sic) said one time I’m sorry.”; (5) Argument that it was jurors’ duty to choose death because “[t]he blood of innocent victims, four innocent victims scream out” “for you to do your duty” and “justice,” and the jurors would be abdicating their duty as “the conscience of the community” and ignoring the victims if they chose life imprisonment; and (6) Argument that a death sentence was required by Georgia statute and if jurors chose life they would have “snatched that section about the death penalty out,” and then simulated ripping a section from the statute. He reiterated that “if your verdict is anything but death, what we need to do is take this book” and simulated throwing it into a trash can. These arguments violated this Court’s jurisprudence on improper prosecutor argument, see e.g. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182 (1986); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), drew two dissents from the Georgia Supreme Court on direct appeal, and were condemned by the concurrence below as “disgusting” and “outrageous.” The lower court found Darden not to be clearly established federal law under Section 2254 of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and held that unless this Court has granted relief on a claim that a prosecutor’s argument violates due process then no due process rule exists. The following questions are presented: 1. Is a lower court bound by Darden, given this Court’s holding in Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37 (2012), that Darden is clearly established Federal law under the AEDPA? 2. Under the totality of the prosecutor’s misconduct, and the fact that jurors still wanted to know whether they could choose life without parole as a sentencing option, was the prosecutor’s argument a harmful violation of due process? ii