Whether prosecutors must disclose inducements provided to witnesses, even in the absence of an agreement with express terms

QUESTION PRESENTED In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985), the Court recognized that a prosecutor must disclose evidence that can be “used to impeach the Government’s witnesses by showing bias or interest.” An open-ended inducement provided to a witness is evidence relevant to that witness’s bias or interest. “The fact that the stake was not guaranteed through a promise or binding contract, but was expressly contingent on the Government’s satisfaction with the end result, serve[s] only to strengthen any incentive to testify falsely in order to secure a conviction.” Id. at 683 (Blackmun, J., joined by O’Connor, J.). The prosecutor in Petitioner David Sattazahn’s case told a key witness that “there are no deals” in connection with the witness’s pending criminal charges. Nevertheless, he immediately followed his disclaimer with the offer to “see what he could do in [the witness’s] case coming up.” However couched, the offer of assistance in the “case coming up” constituted a clear incentive for cooperation; only three weeks after Petitioner’s trial, the witness sought the benefit of the prosecution’s offer and the witness’s cooperation was rewarded with an agreement for a lenient sentence. The inducement was never made known to the defense. Rather, the prosecution elicited misleading testimony from its witness that he had not been “promised anything for [his] pending case” and that he was not “expecting anything” in return for his testimony. The prosecution took no corrective action when its witness testified similarly on cross-examination. In the federal habeas corpus proceedings below, Petitioner sought relief under Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), in light of the prosecution’s failure to reveal the inducement and to correct the witness’s false testimony. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, reasoning due process requires disclosure of a witness’s inducement only when there is a “true agreement” under which “both the witness and the prosecutor . . . understand that the witness will receive favorable treatment in exchange for their testimony.” App. A14. The ruling below, then, sanctions an end-run around the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 USS. 83 (1963), and related cases: so long as the prosecution avoids reaching an express “deal” with express terms, it may grant powerful inducements to its witnesses without disclosing those inducements to the defense. The question presented is as follows: Because there is a split in the Circuits on the issue, should this Court instruct the lower courts to uniformly apply the law that, under United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), a prosecutor must disclose an important prosecution witness’s bias or interest when the prosecutor induces that witness to testify by holding out the hope of favorable treatment, even if the inducement does not take the form of an agreement with specific terms? i