Whether the Eleventh Circuit's wanton disregard for Taylor and its progeny in erecting an illogical and legally erroneous barrier to relief for § 2255 movants seeking vacatur of §§ 924(c) and (0) convictions with no viable predicate—which created a stark circuit split—requires this Court's intervention

QUESTION PRESENTED In United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), this Court held that because attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(8)(A), it is not a viable § 924(c) predicate, and therefore, the corresponding § 924(c) offense cannot stand. That is, one cannot be convicted of a nonoffense; without a viable predicate, “Congress has not authorized courts to convict and sentence [defendants] to a decade of further imprisonment under § 924(c)(8)(A).” Taylor, 142 S. Ct. at 2021. This holding is in line with this Court’s precedents regarding jurisdiction and actual innocence, both of which slice through procedural barriers to relief in the post-conviction context. The Eleventh Circuit, however, disregarded this Court’s clear precedents in erecting a barrier to relief for Davis-based § 2255 movants seeking vacatur of §§ 924(c) and (0) convictions based on invalid predicates post-Taylor. The question presented is: (1) Whether the Eleventh Circuit’s wanton disregard for Taylor and its progeny in erecting an illogical and legally erroneous barrier to relief for § 2255 movants seeking vacatur of §§ 924(c) and (0) convictions with no viable predicate—which created a stark circuit split— requires this Court’s intervention. i INTERESTED PARTIES There are no