Isaiah S. Harris, Sr. v. Deborah S. Hunt, et al.
SocialSecurity DueProcess Securities Patent JusticiabilityDoctri
who-should-decide-whether-to-provide-for-a-damages-remedy,-congress-or-the-courts?
QUESTION(S) PRESENTED _. . ___ Isaiah S. Harris Sr.’s case presents exceptional circumstances that warrant the exercise of this Court’s discretionary power. Where Harris highlights that the willful violation of his protected “~ ~~ civil rights calls for this court to recognize a cause of action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, (U.S. 1971), the federal counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to now include the First Amendment right to access the court to get redress during federal habeas corpus proceedings. The facts of this case forces this court to answer this fundamental question and all related questions stated herein: “who should decide whether to provide for a damages remedy, Congress or the Courts?” 1. Whether or not, in Antoine when this court did a “functional approach analyses”, did this court imply a Bivens cause of action under the First Amendment? See, Antoine y. Byers & Anderson, 950 F.2d 1471, at 1472-1474 (9 Cir. 1991) compare Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, 508 U.S. 429, at 431 1,2. 437 (U.S. 1993) 2. Whether or not, in comparison to the facts of Harris’s case, does his case resemble a worthy cause to expand Bivens to include the First Amendment, in comparison to the 3-times this court has previously approved: “a claim against FBI agents for ; handcuffing a man in his own home without a warrant; a claim against a Congressman for firing his female secretary; and a claim against prison officials for failure to treat an inmate’s asthma.” See, Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, at 140 W.S. 2017) citing Bivens, 403 U.S. 388; Davis, 422 U.S. 288; Carlson, 446 U.S. 14. 3. Whether or not, if this court has adopted a policy in which leaves the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs for certain government officials, in which has the effect of placing them beyond the reach of the law? See, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, at 429 (U.S. 1976) 4. Whether or not, if this principle still holds: “where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.” See, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, at 163 (U.S. 1803) and Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, at 442 (U.S. 1886) 5. Whether or not, if Congress could anticipate or contemplate a cause of action for the set of facts that Harris’s case presents, where a federal court clerk unlawfully suspends a State inmate’s federal habeas corpus proceedings without providing him a remedy for relief outside of this cause of action before this court on certiorari? 6. Whether or not, if this principle still holds: “prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the court. The writ of habeas corpus is the precious safeguard of personal liberty and there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired.” See, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, at 821-822 (U.S, 1977) and Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, at 26 (U.S. 1939) Page ii of viii . s .