Question 1:
In light of this courts decision in McKaskle v. Wiggins. 465 U.S 168, 104 S.Ct. 944; 79
L.Ed 2d 122(1984), as interpreted by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the instant case, when
a defendant takes all the reasonable steps available to him to remedy percieved irreconcilable
differences he has with his court appointed attorney, and the defendants requests are
- subsequently denied by the District Court, does the 6th Amendment as its corollary still afford a
defendant the right to orally request "to move pro se from this moment forward", and to have
such oral request thoroughly addressed by the Court before it is outright denied, and in
subsequent proceedings deemed to either have been acquiesed and waived, or simply a request to
glide in and out of self-representation?

Question 2:
Following this Courts decision in Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S 124, 128 S. Ct.
1572(2008), in the context of Career Offender sentencing enhancements , is it permissible as part
of the categorical approach(or modified categorical approach) to combine two seperate terms in
the Federal Controlled Substance Act', namely, 'Distribute' in §802(11) and 'Delivery' in §802(8),
before deciding that the defendants Pennsylvania state convictions criminalizing 'Delivery' do
cover the same elements encompassed in the Federal term 'Distribute'?

When a defendant takes reasonable steps to remedy perceived irreconcilable differences with court-appointed attorney, does the 6th Amendment afford the right to orally request to proceed pro se before the request is denied?