Karen Gail Brainen Kleinman v. Cynthia A. Norton, Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri
DueProcess FourthAmendment JusticiabilityDoctri
Whether the intent of Congress in enacting 11 U.S.C. §522(1) and Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4003(b) as interpreted by this Court's precedential and controlling decision in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992) (Thomas, J.) applies to all 'secured' and unsecured creditors and who 'forfeit' their purported assets and interests, for failing to protect them by 'fatally' failing to timely file an objection
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether the intent of Congress in enacting 11 U.S.C. §522(1) and Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4003(b) as interpreted by this Court’s : precedential and controlling decision in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992) (Thomas, J.) applies to all “secured” : and unsecured creditors and who “forfeit” j their purported assets and interests, for failing to protect them by “fatally” failing to timely file an objection ? “We reject Taylor’s argument. Davis claimed the lawsuit proceeds as exempt on a list filed with the Bankruptcy Court. Section 522(1)), to repeat, says that [u]nless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt. Rule 4003(b) gives the trustee and creditors | 30 days from the initial creditors’ meeting to object. By | negative implication, the rule indicates that creditors may } not object after 30 days, “unless, within such period, further | time is granted by the court.” The Bankruptcy Court did not | extend the 30-day period. Section 522(1) therefore has made the property exempt. Taylor cannot contest the exemption ' at this time whether or not Davis had a colorable statutory | basis for claiming it.” (emphasis and underscoring added) “DEADLINES may lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt the parties to act and they produce FINALITY.” | | t ! (ii) 2. Whether Respondents, an Article I Bankruptcy Judge and Chapter 13 Trustee, who respectively took “oaths” of office and : swore allegiance to uphold, defend and protect the Constitution of the United States, the integrity of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and its process, and to render fair and impartial justice equally to the rich and poor, can with impunity, contumaciously disregard their duties of “mandatory obedience” to the “rule of : law” and “stare decisis” specifically “thumbing their noses” at this Court’s precedential and controlling decisions in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S.415, and Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 U.S. 3 and “deny, deprive and defraud” Petitioner of the most fundamental “self-executing” statutory “homestead” exemption provisions and protections embodied within the underlying rehabilitative purposes and goals of the Bankruptcy Code’s “fresh start” policy; and unconscionably disregard the protections of the Permanent Federal Discharge Injunction pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2), and the principles of “res judicata” and “collateral estoppel;” and “shred” debtor/Petitioner’s guaranteed and protected Constitutional rights to procedural and substantive “due process” and the “equal protection” of the law under the 5th and 14th Amendments... . . and when challenged to account for their respective egregious Judicial and/or Trustee misconduct and/or dereliction of administrative, ministerial or fiduciary duties. . .“ESCAPE” all responsibility, accountability and liability by. seeking refuge and hiding behind the doctrine of “JUDICIAL IMMUNITY” ? Or have they become “trespassers” of the law and personally, individually and/or collectively accountable and liable for their “rogue” actions, criminal misbehavior, and “betrayal” of their honest services to the U.S.A,. Petitioner, and the general public, tantamount to “TREASON” ? “No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his solemn oath to support it.” Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) i (iii) : 3. Whether a Bankruptcy Court is a “court of the United : States” under 28 U.S.C. § 451 and whether it possesses authority : to grant or deny “in forma pauperis relief” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 2? (in re Perroton, 958 F.2d 889 (9*» Cir. 1992 and | numerous cases cited) (NO); and In re Broady, 247 B.R. 470 (2000) (B.A.P. 8‘ Cir.) (NO). In re Karen Gail Brainen Kleinman, pursuant to Respondent Bankruptcy Judge Norton and District Court Judge Ketchmark: YES. There also appears to be a Circuit “split” on the issue. 4. Whether denial of “in forma pauperis relief” at any l