Is the AEDPA's one-year limitation period for state prisoners to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel triggered by conclusion of 'direct appeal-equivalent' initial-review collateral proceedings described in Martinez v. Ryan in favor of conclusion of direct appeal proceedings in which review of such claims is barred by the State?

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW | The United States Constitution, through the Suspension Clause | and the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees to prisoners the right : to federal habeas corpus review of state convictions. U.S. . CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, amend. XIV, § 1. . The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") imposes a one-year limitation for prisoners to file ' habeas corpus petitions, which is triggered by conclusion of "direct review," as well as a requirement to exhaust all claims in state court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(A), 2254(b)(1)(A). In many states, prisoners are not allowed to raise on direct ; appeal claims of ineffective assistance, but must instead wait until a state initial-review collateral proceeding ("IRCP") to raise them in the first instance. Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 8, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012); see also Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 429, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 185 L.Ed.2d 1044 (2013) (extending Martinez rule based on Texas's "procedrual framework" preventing review of ineffective-counsel claims until the IRCP). The Supreme Court described the state-created IRCP as "in many ways the equivalent of [prisoners'] direct appeal[s] as to the claim[s]." Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S., at 11. Therefore, : Is the AEDPA's one-year limitation period for state prisoners ; to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel triggered by conclusion of "direct appeal-equivalent" initial-review collateral proceedings described in Martinez v. Ryan in favor of conclusion of direct appeal proceedings in which review of such claims is barred by the State? ii