Whether the First Circuit's affirmance of the District Court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedent holding that 'persons who are personally denied equal treatment by the challenged discri, minatory conduct' have standing

QUESTIONS PRESENTED: Recently, Justice Thomas remarked how, despite the clear constitutional prohibition against racial classifications, government actors continue to “go to great lengths to hide and perpetuate their unlawful [discrimination]” under fashionable but pernicious concepts such as “equity.” Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 143 S.Ct. 2141, 2191 (2023) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas of course was right. During the COVID-19 pandemic, New Hampshire State officials, in the name of equity, created a : particularly pernicious Trojan Horse device to expressly prioritize “non-Whites” over Whites in the distribution of fungible vaccine-doses. The device involved a_race-neutral allocation deliberately coupled with a race-specific (non-Whites only) allocation in order to try to prevent Whites from having standing to challenge the racial classification. When Petitioner sought Section 1983 money-damages and other relief against State officials after they denied his actual request for the : vaccine in the race-specific allocation, the officials argued that he lacked standing. The officials made a “but for” argument that Petitioner could not show that he would have gotten the vaccine any earlier in the race-neutral allocation had the (unconstitutional) race-specific allocation—which the officials nonetheless continued to operate for the duration of the State’s vaccination program—not existed in the first place. The officials further argued that, in any case, they had qualified immunity from Petitioner’s money damages claim because the unconstitutionality of ii prioritizing non-Whites over Whites during a novel pandemic such as COVID-19 was not clearly established at the time of suit. The District Court without opinion accepted the officials arguments, and, while denying Petitioner’s motion for jurisdictional discovery, summarily dismissed his claims. See App. 4a. The First Circuit then without opinion summarily affirmed the dismissal and the denial. See App. la. The questions presented thus are: 1. Whether the First Circuit’s affirmance of the District Court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s precedent holding that “persons who are personally denied equal treatment by the challenged discri, minatory conduct” have standing. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, Syllabus (1984). In other words, doesn’t a plaintiff suffer a personalized constitutional injury and have standing to assert Section 1983 claims (including money-damages) for racial discrimination when government officials create dual “separate but (un)equal” categories—one race-neutral | and one race-specific-—for the distribution of a fungible government benefit, and the plaintiff, who is indisputably entitled to that benefit, requests the benefit under the race-specific category but is denied it there solely because of his race—even as similarlysituated members of the favored-race aren’t denied it there—and consequently only receives the benefit at a much later date and with much more difficulty under the race-neutral category. In other words, can a racial classification perversely be its own shield by being deliberately coupled with a race neutral category in a situation? eee iii 2. Whether government officials may otherwise defeat standing of a plaintiff on Section 1983 claims in a racial discrimination case simply by placing a geographic limitation on the race-specific category, when the officials don’t enforce that geographic limitation against the favored race, and _ that | geographic limitation itself is based on race in the first place—such as the Clinton Foundation’s “COVID-19 Community Vulnerability Index” or CCVI that uses race as a factor. In other words, does a racial classification have to perfectly benefit all members of one race and/or perfectly burden all members of another race in order for a plaintiff to have standing to seek relief for being discriminated against under it? 3. Whether the First Circ