Whether the trial court's jury charge violated the defendant's due process rights by creating an impermissible conclusive presumption that relieved the state of its burden of proof

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1. Whether the trial court’s charge to Petitioner’s jury violate his Due Process rights as articulated in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), because a reasonable juror could have interpreted it charged instruction as effectively creating an impermissible conclusive presumption that improperly relieved the State of the burden of proving the Petitioner guilty on all elements of malice aforethought murder? 2. Whether the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals erred when denying a COA; accepting the District Court’s conclusions regarding the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ application of transferred intent, because although the OCCA is the final authority on application of Oklahoma State law, it is not the final authority on the interpretation which a jury could have given the instructions under Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514 (1979), and the application of transferred intent by the OCCA created a hypothesized verdict that the jury never in fact rendered violating the jury-trial guarantee condemned in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)? 3. Whether the State committed waiver of the Fourth Amendment claims as expressed in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 205, 209 (1981) and confessed the claims under Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 8(b)(6) by not answering the allegations in both State court and on habeas? Did the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals err in denying a COA by not permitting review of claims under 2253(c) on claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in part, on the basis ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate and motion to suppress evidence obtained by multiple warrantless and illegal seizures in violation of the Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment right to expectation of privacy that were not answered by the State? Did the Tenth Circuit Court err giving deference to the lower court’s rulings when the State plainly misrepresented the underlying Fourth Amendment claims on post-conviction and on habeas causing the State courts and the U.S. District: court to unreasonably apply Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978) to the underlying merits of the ineffective assistance claims that are indeed not Franks claims; was the lowest state court’s decision an ‘adjudication on the merits’ warranting deference under §2254(d)? f -iiLIST OF ALL