Whether Brady claims are 'second or successive' under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) when the suppressed evidence comes to light only after the dismissal of an initial federal habeas petition

QUESTION PRESENTED The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), imposes heightened requirements on a petitioner who attempts to file a “second or successive” habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Whether petitioner Kevin Keith meets the heightened requirements is not the subject of this request for certiorari. Rather, the question presented is whether his habeas petition is “second or successive” as used in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)—because only a “second or successive” petition must meet those heightened requirements. This Court has made clear that “second or successive” is a term of art that must be defined in reference to the historical abuse-of-the-writ doctrine, which bars only those claims that could have been (but were not) raised in the first petition. The Court has also made clear that petitions raising newly ripened claims are not “second or successive,” because requiring petitioners to file unripe claims in their initial habeas petition contravenes the purposes of AEDPA. Here, both the District Court and the Sixth Circuit suggested that Keith has a viable Brady claim—because the State has repeatedly suppressed material exculpatory evidence in his case. Indeed, the State conceded during oral argument that Brady violations had been committed. But these courts nonetheless dismissed that claim, finding that his petition is “second or successive” and that he could not meet the heightened requirements of § 2244(b)(2). Accordingly, this case squarely presents the following question for review: i Are Brady claims “second or successive” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) when the suppressed evidence comes to light only after the dismissal of an initial federal habeas petition? ii