Did the Fifth Circuit flout SCOTUS precedent in Buck v. Davis?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED A. Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit completely flout this Court's precedent as set forth in Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100 (2017), which specifically addressed a prior, similar procedural error by the same court in Buck v. Stephens, 623 , Fed.Appx. 668:(5th Cir. 2015)(reversed and remanded by Buck v. Davis, Supra), where Petitioner Plunkett clearly demonstrated to the district court and to the Fifth Circuit that the resolution of Plunkett's +:: claims was, at the very least, debatable, and at worst completely wrong resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice? B. If the answer to the first question is’in the affirmative, should this Court remand the appeal back to the Fifth Circuit with directions to assign the appeal to:a different panel or should this Court exercise its discretion to take up Plunkett's appeal directly due to Circuit Split on the merits issues, the Fifth Circuit's denial of rehearing despite full and thoughtful briefing on the issues, and the political implications of this case? C. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, 4 and this Court takes up Plunkett's appeal directly, did Plunkett demonstrate the threshold showing as articulated by this Court for issuance of a Certificate of Appealability where Plunkett stated multiple, valid claims of the denial of Constitutional rights and where Plunkett also convincingly demonstrated that jurists of reason would find it debatable, at the very least, whether the district court was correct in its ruling on the merits where Plunkett submitted uncontroverted testimony and documentary evidence that his plea, sentencing, and appellate counsel were all ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution? | D. Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit err in its summary affirmance, despite thorough and thoughtful briefing on the issues in both the district court and the Circuit court, of the district court's denial of Plunkett's 28 U.S.C. 88144 & 455 Motions to Disqualify/Recuse the district court where Plunkett complied with all statutory requirements of §144, there are open ques=* tions in the Fifth Circuit(conflicting intra-Circuit law as to §144 procedure), and the district court failed, in the first instance, to examine its own mind and biases and where the district court's determination on this issue is in violation of this Court's precedent as set forth in Liteky E. Is the test used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, as set forth in United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1998), to determine whether a "promise" has been made to a criminal defendant by his or her counsel, unconstitutional on equal protection grounds where an incarcerated criminal defendant could virtually never clear the bar of the third prong of the test simply by virtue of his or her incarceration causing an untenable disparity between the criminal defendant who is in-carcerated and the one who is not? F. Is’ the same test noted in the preceding question ill-advised considering the implications to attorney-client privilege where no such privilege would exist between the criminal defendant and any such "eyewitness" to any such alleged promise and, in any event, the district court is to determine the credibility of witnesses and the plausibility of any such claimed promises after examining the record of the proceedings and any other submitted evidence as a whole‘and, as such, should :the Cervantes test be abrogated by this-Court? 2 G. In the current era of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, where the Guidelines have now been practiced for almost four decades, does a criminal defense attorney, representing a defendant in a guilty plea advisory role, operaté outside of “prevailing professional norms" and, therefore, provide ifieffective assistance of counsel, by advising his or her client with affirmatively wvong advice concerning how the U