Whether clearly established federal law as determined by this Court forbids the prosecution's use of a woman's plainly irrelevant sexual history, gender presentation, and role as a mother and wife to assess guilt and punishment

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Brenda Andrew faces execution for the shooting death of her estranged husband. Her co-defendant, James Pavatt, confessed to plotting and committing the murder without her. To bolster its circumstantial case against Ms. Andrew, the State exploited sex-based stereotypes and presented concededly irrelevant evidence about her sexual history, gender presentation, demeanor, and motherhood. At trial, the prosecution relentlessly derided Ms. Andrew, using sexually-charged descriptions to cast her in the role of an unchaste wife. The State elicited testimony about Ms. Andrew’s “short skirt, low-cut tops, just sexy outfits,” “very tight” dresses, “a leather outfit” that was not “appropriate,” and otherwise “improper clothing.” The State’s sexbased argument peaked when the prosecution called Ms. Andrew a “slut puppy” and displayed her thong underwear during its guilt-phase closing argument. The State similarly fixated on Ms. Andrew’s demeanor where it did not comport with stereotypically feminine standards. In just over one day of testimony, Ms. Andrew’s demeanor and lack of tears were referenced fifteen times. Subsequently, during the penalty phase closing arguments, the State relied on Ms. Andrew’s demeanor in comparing her to stereotypes of women generally. The State invited the jury to convict and condemn Ms. Andrew to die because she was a “hoochie,” was a bad mother and wife, did not cry publicly, and otherwise failed to adhere to feminine stereotypes. Judge Johnson’s dissent at the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) observed this presentation had “no purpose other than to hammer home that Brenda Andrew is a bad wife, bad mother, and a bad woman.” Judge Bacharach’s Tenth Circuit dissent identified a “slew of errors” affecting “the fundamental fairness” of the conviction. Among these was a Miranda violation that occurred when the police signed Ms. Andrew’s hospital discharge papers, placed her in the back of a police car, and interrogated her at the police station, where, clad only in two hospital gowns, she curled up in a fetal position and whimpered. Although police repeatedly refused her requests to leave, the OCCA held she was not in custody. This petition presents the following questions: 1. Whether clearly established federal law as determined by this Court forbids the prosecution’s use of a woman’s plainly irrelevant sexual history, gender presentation, and role as a mother and wife to assess guilt and punishment. 2. Whether this Court should summarily reverse in light of cumulative effect of the errors in this case at guilt and sentencing, including the introduction of a custodial statement made without the warnings Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) requires. i