Whether RICO incorporates state-law elements or only generic offense categories

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), outlaws participating in an “enterprise” through “a pattern of racketeering activity.” RICO defines “racketeering activity” to include any act “indictable” under certain enumerated federal statutes, id. § 1961(1)(B), and “any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance ... which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year,” id. § 1961(1)(A). The questions presented are: 1. Does § 1961(1)(A) of RICO incorporate—and thereby require the Government to plead and prove beyond a reasonable doubt—the elements of specific state-law offenses charged as “racketeering activity,” as the Second Circuit holds, or does this provision reference only generic categories of offenses, as the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits hold? 2. Is RICO’s “racketeering activity” element “divisible,” such that courts may use the “modified categorical approach” and consider the individual racketeering acts proven in a particular case to determine if the defendant’s RICO violation qualifies as an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) “crime of violence,” as the Second and Third Circuits hold, or are these various acts i merely different “means” of committing the single, indivisible element of “racketeering activity,” as the Fourth and Fifth Circuits hold? ii