Does a defendant's guilty plea to an indictment charging multiple violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), unlawful firearm possession, waive his Double Jeopardy claim on appeal when neither the indictment nor the plea colloquy sets forth the facts necessary to establish that each count is based on a separate unit of prosecution, i.e., a separate and distinct act of possession?

Question Presented In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), and Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975), this Court held that a defendant who pleads guilty can still raise on appeal any constitutional claim that does not depend on challenging his “factual guilt.” This Court reaffirmed that rule in Class v. United States, by holding that the defendant’s guilty plea did not bar his constitutional claims on appeal because they did “not contradict the terms of the indictment or the written plea agreement” and could be “resolved without any need to venture beyond that record.” 583 U.S. 174, 181 (2018). Nonetheless, there is a five-circuit split regarding how these authorities apply in the context of a guilty plea to multiple counts charging violations of the same statutory provision, in particular, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The question presented is: Does a defendant’s guilty plea to an indictment charging multiple violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), unlawful firearm possession, waive his Double Jeopardy claim on appeal when neither the indictment nor the plea colloquy sets forth the facts necessary to establish that each count is based on a separate unit of prosecution, i.e., a separate and distinct act of possession? i