Whether the rule announced in Wetzel applies where the rationales offered by the state court are so dependent upon one another that they cannot be accurately described as 'alternative'

QUESTIONS PRESENTED (Capital Case) Robert Ybarra, Jr., is on death row in Nevada. He is intellectually disabled. During a state court hearing on his claim under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), Ybarra’s experts testified that he had an IQ of 60, had deficits in adaptive behaviors, and that the onset of his disability was during the developmental period. The State’s expert testified he received an IQ score of 66, but concluded on the basis of the Test of Memory Malingering that Ybarra malingered the 66 score, and must have also malingered the score of 60. On appeal, to resolve the disputes about the testing, the Nevada Supreme Court assumed that only testing from the developmental period was relevant. Thus, because the court ruled the developmental period ended at age-18, the Nevada Supreme Court believed only pre-18 evidence needed to be considered. Because all the testing occurred after Ybarra turned 18, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected Ybarra’s Atkins claim. On federal habeas review, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision was reasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) because, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, there were alternative reasons supporting the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit’s approach implicates two questions, both reflecting a split between the circuit courts of appeal. 1. In Weitzel v. Lambert, 565 U.S. 520, 525 (2012), this Court held that when a state court gives alternative grounds for rejecting a federal claim, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) prohibits habeas relief “unless each ground supporting the state court i decision is examined and found to be unreasonable under AEDPA.” Does the rule announced in Wetzel apply where the rationales offered by the state court are so dependent upon one another that they cannot be accurately described as “alternative”? 2. In Wilson v. Sellers, 138 8. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018), this Court explained that deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is a “straightforward inquiry” requiring a federal court to “simply review|[] the specific reasons given by the state court and defer[] to those reasons if they are reasonable.” May a federal court instead manufacture other reasons—not adopted by the state court in its reasoned decision—and defer to those reasons? ii